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1. Introduction 
This short study analyses theoretical and practical aspects of introducing an EU-wide 
reinsurance scheme for national unemployment insurance systems. The objective of the 
study is to elaborate on the welfare gains of such a setup, and to flesh out what such a 
scheme could look like from a practical point of view and thus provide policy-makers and 
the wider public with a ‘tangible’ example they can examine. 
The study has four sections in addition to this brief introduction. 
In Section 2, we review existing reinsurance schemes in the United States and Switzerland. 
Although both schemes are very different from our proposal for Europe, they provide 
inspiration for particular aspects of the proposal.  
In Section 3, we assess reinsurance schemes from a theoretical point of view, outlining the 
rationale for such schemes, in principle, and their welfare benefits.  
In Section 4, we discuss possible key characteristics of the scheme, namely contributions 
(including their macroeconomic impact and the possibility to differentiate rates/premiums 
according to country risks), pay-outs (with or without earmarking) and the size of the 
scheme, issues regarding the potential triggering of the pay-out and possible threshold 
effects, and stabilisation effects. We do this by presenting a detailed scheme design as well as 
a simple retrospective simulation of how the scheme would have operated in the period 
2000-12, had it been in existence. 
In Section 5, we summarise our findings in an accessible and clear way. 
2. The Swiss and US models 
We start this study by looking for inspiration in two (con)federations: the United States and 
Switzerland. Despite their different sizes, the two case studies shed light on how federal 
states manage unemployment insurance (UI) schemes and their estimation of the best level 
at which to organise such schemes. The decision to centralise UI at the highest level has not 
only produced different systems but also seems to have been determined by different needs.  
For each of the two cases, we sketch answers to the following questions:  
 How is unemployment insurance organised? 
 What do the data say?  
 Why is the case interesting?  
                                                   
* Miroslav Beblavý is a Member of the Slovak Parliament (since 2010) and a Senior Research Fellow at 
CEPS. Daniel Gros is Director of CEPS. Ilaria Maselli is a researcher in the Economics and Social 
Welfare Policies unit at CEPS. The authors are grateful to Amin Bahrami for his diligent research 
assistance.  
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2.1 The Swiss system 
How does it work?  
For wages up to 10,500 Swiss francs (€8,588) per month, the replacement rate of 
unemployment insurance in the Swiss system is 70% of the worker’s average wage over the 
last six to twelve months of his/her employment. The rate goes up to 80% for workers with 
dependent children. The unemployment allowance is granted on a daily basis (five 
allowances a week). The maximum duration of the allowance is 260 daily allowances if the 
insured person can demonstrate a contribution period of 12 months in total, and 400 daily 
allowances if the insured person proves a contribution period of 18 months in total. 
The main organisation responsible for unemployment benefits is the State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs (SECO), but cantons and communes play a very important role in the 
administration of the process, especially in light of the very close link established by the 
Swiss system between active and passive labour market policies. The unemployment scheme 
in Switzerland is rather generous, but it is conditional on the participation of the 
unemployed person in the active labour market programmes, under the supervision of the 
regional unemployment office, as stipulated by the federal law. 
Battaglini and Giraud (2003) argue that different cantons use different “policy styles” in their 
approach to labour market policies: some cantons primarily use ALMP instruments aimed at 
improving the reintegration of unemployed persons into the labour market, while others are 
more intent on preventing unemployment benefit abuse. The authors argue that “policy 
styles influenced by interventionist traditions and more leftist political forces are more prone 
to use job-seeker reintegration instruments. On the contrary, policy styles influenced by 
more liberal traditions and conservative political forces give preference to control 
instruments or the simultaneous use of both types of instruments”. According to Battaglini 
and Giraud, another factor that explains how the same federal law is applied locally in 
different ways is the regional diversity that results from language or religious segmentations.  
Unemployment insurance is compulsory for all non-self-employed employees and is 
financed both by employers and employees. Contributions are collected along with other 
social insurance schemes and are split equally between the employer and employee. The 
contribution rate is set at 2.2% (i.e. 1.1% each for the employer and employee) of insured 
earnings, up to a maximum gross salary of 126,000 francs (€103,051) per year. Workers 
earning higher wages pay an additional solidarity contribution.1  
Both the Confederation and the cantons support the financing of the unemployment 
insurance. The Confederation contributes to the costs of the employment service and of the 
active labour market programmes at the rate of 0.159% of the total amount of salaries subject 
to contributions, while the share of the cantons is 0.053%. The payments from all over 
Switzerland are gathered in a single fund at the federal level and the unemployment benefits 
are paid out of this same fund. This Unemployment Insurance Compensation Fund also 
derives revenue from returns on its assets. In case the means described above are not 
sufficient to cover the costs of insurance, the federal government grants short-term cash 
loans according to market conditions.  To ensure long-term stability of the fund, the Federal 
Council can, at the end of the year, raise or lower the contribution rate.  
                                                   
1 Solidarity of 1% (employee: 0.5%; employer: 0.5%) is levied on pay bands between 126,000 francs 
(€103,051) and 315,000 francs (€257,627).  
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Some data 
The performance of the Swiss labour market is the envy of many advanced economies. 
According to data provided by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics, the average rate of 
unemployment of Swiss nationals over the decade 2003-13 was 3%.2  Despite the low levels, 
however, there are relatively strong disparities between cantons. For instance, the 
unemployment ratio observed in Geneva in December 2010 was more than six times larger 
than that observed in Obwald in the same month (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Ratio of people registered as unemployed to canton population, December 2010 
 
Source: Office fédéral de la statistique, Switzerland. 
According to a study carried out by the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(Flückiger et al., 2006), cantonal differences are sensitive to the business cycle in such a way 
that they increase during upswings and decrease during downturns. When the situation 
deteriorates, all cantons are affected by the decrease in economic activity that results in an 
increase in unemployment inflows proportional to the size of the labour force. However, 
when the economy improves, the rate of unemployment falls more in some cantons than 
others, which show more pronounced exit rates from unemployment. One could infer that 
the divergence in recovery patterns is due to structural differences between the small 
entities. As a result, different cantons spend different shares of their GDP on income 
protection measures (Figure 2).  
                                                   
2 The Swiss Federal Office of Statistics also calculates a separate rate for foreigners. The average over 
the same period is 8.1%, but they constitute a small share of the population.  
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Figure 2. Yearly unemployment benefit payments as a percentage of canton GDP, average 2008-11 
 
Source: Office fédéral de la statistique, Switzerland. 
Why is the Swiss case interesting?  
The Swiss Confederation gives large powers to its 26 cantons and 2,396 communes in the 
organisation of policies. Yet, unemployment insurance (as well as disability and ageing 
insurance) is organised at the federal level. The question is therefore: Why is income 
protection against unemployment a federal rather than a local policy, despite the 
divergences observed among the local labour markets?  
A review of the literature and official reports suggest two main reasons. The first is a 
‘solidarity element’; the second is dictated by the ‘law of large numbers’. For the fund to be 
balanced, a large number of contributors is needed. Given the small size of the cantons and 
of the country itself, the optimal level to organise an unemployment insurance scheme can 
therefore only be the federal one.   
2.2 The US system 
How does it work?  
The US federal unemployment compensation (UC) programme provides income support to 
workers who lose their jobs for up to a maximum of 26 weeks in most states. Approximately 
130 million jobs are covered by the programme. As at the end of the week of 17 August 2013, 
2.9 million unemployed workers were receiving unemployment compensation with an 
average weekly compensation of $307. Estimated expenditure on regular unemployment 
benefits in 2014 amounts to $40.5 billion (Whittaker and Isaacs, 2013).  
In case of severe recessions and consequent high unemployment in a state, extended benefits 
can be launched, funded 50% by the state and 50% by the federal government (and 
exceptionally, 100% by the federal government in the 2009 stimulus package).   
The US system constitutes an obvious point of comparison for the potential European 
system, given that the UC programme centralises part of the organisation but still allows 
each state the possibility to tailor certain features and requirements.  
UC in the United States in fact is administered by a joint federal-state programme financed 
by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes 
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under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). The FUTA tax rate for employers is 6% of 
labour costs, but a credit of 5.4% is granted for employers in states that have a national 
system in place, which is the case today for all US states. The provision served in the past as 
an incentive for all states to create an insurance scheme, as it constituted a minimum floor for 
employers in every state.  
Most businesses are subject to state and federal unemployment taxes. An estimated $6.7 
billion in federal unemployment taxes (FUTA) and $44.47 billion in state unemployment 
taxes (SUTA) should have been collected in the financial year 2011-12 (Whittaker and Isaacs, 
2011). Part of the former is used by each state to cover the administrative costs of its system, 
and the latter part finances the extended benefits when needed.  
Unlike in most European countries, the US version of an unemployment insurance scheme is 
fully financed by employers. The mechanism is based on the principle that those that fire 
more also need to contribute more to the fund. For the firms’ side of the labour market, the 
system is organised as insurance: companies need to insure themselves against the risk of 
firing a certain number of workers. The same is not true for employees, who do not 
contribute to the fund. From their point of view, therefore, the benefits qualify instead as 
social assistance in the form of income protection.3 
The system is administered by the US Department of Labor (DOL). Federal law sets broad 
rules that the state programmes must follow, including the broad categories of workers that 
must be covered by the programme, the method for triggering the Extended Benefit (EB) and 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 programmes, the highest state 
unemployment tax rate to be imposed on employers (5.4%), and how the states will repay 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) loans. If the states do not follow these rules, their 
employers may lose a portion of their state unemployment tax credit when their federal 
income tax is calculated. The federal tax pays for both federal and state administrative costs, 
the federal share of the EB programme, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, and state 
employment services (Whittaker and Isaacs, 2011). 
Maximum benefit levels vary enormously, from $133 per week in Puerto Rico to $625 in 
Massachusetts.4 States can obtain loans from the Federal Unemployment Account should 
they run low on funds, but the deficit needs to be cleared in the long run.  
Some data 
A certain level of dispersion around the average national unemployment rate also exists in 
the United States. For example, at the height of the financial crisis in 2009-10, the rate of 
unemployment in Michigan was three times higher than that of North Dakota. According to 
the long-term average, unemployment in California is more than two times higher than in 
North or South Dakota. As shown in Figure 3, States with higher unemployment rates spend 
a higher portion of their budgets on unemployment benefits.  
                                                   
3 This is due to the fact that it is not the workers that insure themselves against the risk of 
unemployment, since the contribution is paid by employers. Workers simply receive the benefit in 
case of job loss.  
4 2011 data.  
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Figure 3. Correlation by state between unemployment rates and unemployment payments as a 
percentage of state GDP, average 2000-13  
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor. 
Why is the US case interesting?  
The US case is worth studying not only due to the size of the labour market, which is 
comparable to the European one, but also for three additional reasons: 
 the reason why the UC system was brought in at the federal level – i.e. to avoid social 
dumping; 
 the experience rating at state level; and 
 the additionality in case of severe recessions.  
The origin of the system dates back to the mid-1930s. The Great Depression had made it clear 
that an income support mechanism was necessary, and a number of states started to 
investigate and make proposals in this direction. The main obstacle, however, remained 
employers’ fears of losing competitiveness vis-à-vis neighbouring states. This made 
intervention at the federal level necessary. Witte (1936) explains: 
Throughout the history of the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social 
Security Act, there was general agreement regarding the necessity for federal 
legislation. It was recognized by everyone who believed in the desirability of 
unemployment insurance that little headway could be made unless employers in all 
states would be subject to the same (or substantially the same) costs, whether their 
respective states enacted unemployment insurance laws or not. 
As a result, the creation of a common minimum standard was not expressed in terms of the 
level of protection, but in terms of employers’ contributions necessary in order to finance the 
policy.  
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WVWI
WY
0.00%
0.02%
0.04%
0.06%
0.08%
0.10%
0.12%
0.14%
0.16%
2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0%
A
ve
ra
ge
 Y
ea
rl
y 
FU
TA
 re
ci
ep
ts
 a
s p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 G
D
P 
20
00
-2
01
2 
Average Unemployment Rate 2000-2013
REINSURANCE OF NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SCHEMES  7 
 
The experience rating at state level 
In case of a lack of liquidity, a state can borrow from federal funds, with interest charged on 
loans that are not repaid by the end of the fiscal year in which they were obtained. States 
facing troubles in financing their own insurance can therefore ask for help from the federal 
fund, but only in the form of a loan that needs to be repaid based on an agreement with the 
US Secretary of Labor. If the state fails to restore the balance between revenues and 
expenditure of national funds in the medium run, the federal authority raises the firms’ 
contribution.5   
A less remarked upon, but interesting aspect of the US system is its capacity to strike a 
balance vis-à-vis individual states over the cycle. Each state can indeed borrow from the 
federal cash pot in hard times, but these remain loans and as such need to be returned. This 
in principle ensures that the objective of stabilising income when most needed is not missed, 
but at the same time avoids free-riding. If a state is unable to repay the loan, the employers’ 
contribution is raised by the federal authority, as happened recently in California, for 
example, where the fund currently runs a deficit of almost $10 billion (Employment 
Development Department, 2013). 
Additionality in case of severe recessions  
One of the added values of the federal system lies in the possibility to extend benefits in 
exceptional cases of severe recessions in one or more states, i.e. when the stabilisation tool is 
most needed. This takes place via the extended and emergency benefits, with the former 
partially and the latter completely financed at the federal level. Extended benefits are the 
geographically redistributive part of the system.  
Figure 4. Total unemployment insurance benefits paid by month and type of programme in the United 
States, 2007-10  
 
Source: Boushey and Eizenga (2011).  
2.3 Lessons from the two (con)federations  
This section raises two main questions:  
                                                   
5 “For calendar year 2013, employers in 13 states and the Virgin Islands face an increased net federal 
unemployment tax (FUTA) because the state UC program had borrowed funds from the federal UTF 
loan account for two consecutive years” (Whittaker and Isaacs, 2014). 
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 What are the reasons behind the decision to make income stabilisation via 
unemployment benefits a federal policy in the United States and in Switzerland?  
 Can the EU learn anything from the way in which the two (con)federations organised 
their policy? 
In response to the first question, according to our review, the reasons behind the two 
countries’ decisions are: 
 a solidarity principle; 
 a problem with the size of the federal entities in Switzerland; and 
 the need to create an income stabilisation tool in case of recession, without generating a 
competitive disadvantage for national firms, which is able to absorb even severe blows.   
The extent of solidary is essentially a political issue. Most EU member countries are at least 
as big as Switzerland, so the size issue is not very relevant. Therefore, the key issue is the 
need to create an income stabilisation tool in case of recession.  
On the one hand, unlike in the United States in the 1930s, national unemployment benefits 
systems have been in place in European countries for approximately a century, albeit with 
different levels of generosity and taxation. However, different systems in Europe clearly 
have very different stabilisation capacities.6 The experience of the recent years has also 
shown that severe recessions can overcome the ability of some national systems to cope and 
can lead to pro-cyclical policies. 
The US case also offers inspiration in two ways. One is additionality at the highest level – in 
case of a severe recession, unemployment benefits can be extended, paid by the federal 
budget. The possibility to top up national systems whenever there is no sign of recovery in 
the economy is certainly an interesting feature. Such decisions, however, can be taken in the 
United States relatively quickly. For additionality to be implemented in the EU, automated 
decision-making would be necessary given the intrinsic slow nature of decision-making at 
the European level.  The experience rating is also an element worth examining. Each US state 
can receive funds from the federal pot, but the deficit needs to be cleared in the long run. 
These two principles will factor in our proposal for how to organise a European 
Unemployment Insurance (EUI).  
3. A fiscal shock absorber for the eurozone? Lessons from the economics 
of insurance 
Even before the euro crisis started, it had been widely argued that the eurozone needed a 
mechanism to help countries overcome idiosyncratic shocks. The experience of the crisis 
itself seemed to make an overwhelming case for this argument, and throughout the EU 
institutions it is now taken for granted that the eurozone needs a system of fiscal shock 
absorbers. For example, a 2012 Report of the President of the European Council calls for: 
“Stage 3 (post-2014): establish a well-defined and limited fiscal capacity to improve shock 
absorption capacities, through an insurance system set up at the central level…” (Van 
Rompuy, 2012, p. 5).  
Following this line of thought, a number of shock-absorber mechanisms have been proposed 
recently. These mechanisms usually stipulate that a certain percentage of each upswing or 
downturn in the economy should be offset by payments to a central fund (e.g. Dullien, 2013; 
Enderlein et al., 2013). But this approach neglects a key insight from the economics of 
insurance. 
                                                   
6 For a discussion, see Dolls et al. (2012). 
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3.1 Insurance and convexity 
Insurance is particularly useful when the cost of unpredictable events is convex, i.e. when a 
shock of twice the magnitude of another one causes more than twice as much damage, 
because if this is the case the expected value of the cost of being hit by a shock is not simply a 
linear function of the disturbance. The standard case for insurance at the microeconomic 
level is simply that utility functions are assumed to be concave (and hence the cost of losing 
income is also convex). In macroeconomic terms, this means that the political and economic 
cost of a recession with an increase of unemployment by 4 percentage points is not simply 
twice that of a recession which is half as strong in terms of unemployment (i.e. with a 2 
percentage point increase). The euro crisis has vividly illustrated that the costs of large 
shocks can be disproportionately large, especially when the shock impairs access to financial 
markets. In this case, consumption smoothing is no longer possible, or is very expensive. The 
case of Greece has also shown that the social cost of very large, ‘catastrophic’ shocks can be 
extremely severe, because a shock that leads to insolvency creates other problems, including 
widespread bankruptcy costs. By contrast, the small shocks that were prevalent during the 
Great Moderation did not involve large costs, as temporary shocks to output or income can 
be smoothed at a low cost via savings or borrowing in capital markets.7 
There are thus good reasons why social loss functions are assumed to be convex. Most 
optimal control models simply assume a special form of convexity, namely that the social 
loss function is quadratic in output (or in output compared to its equilibrium level; see 
Blanchard and Fischer, 1989).8 
3.2 Insurance with deductible first best 
A widespread practice in the insurance industry is to offer clients full coverage only above a 
certain deductible or threshold. This approach should be applied to the discussion about the 
need for a shock absorber for the eurozone as well. 
The basic idea behind insurance with a deductible can be illustrated easily. Figure 5 shows 
the usual quadratic social loss function (blue lines) as the square of the shock that is hitting 
the economy (e.g. the increase in unemployment or the fall in GDP) on the horizontal axis. 
This is what the economy would be subject to in the absence of an insurance mechanism. 
With a (partial) shock absorber that offsets a certain percentage of the shock (as proposed by 
Enderlein et al., 2013), the welfare impact of all shocks is lower, as indicated by the red line. 
An alternative to a shock absorber is to introduce a deductible, but to fully compensate all 
shocks above that threshold. The resulting welfare loss as a function of the shock is indicated 
by the green line (where the threshold was set at 1). 
The actuarially fair price for both insurance policies will of course depend on the parameters 
of the probability density function of the shocks, the percentage of the shock absorbed and 
the deductible. 
                                                   
7 There is some confusion in the literature on the purpose of shock absorbers. In principle, the ultimate 
motive for insurance should be to smooth consumption over time. But most empirical analysis 
concentrates on the variability of income (GDP). Asdrubali et al. (1996) are among the few to analyse 
how variations in income are transmitted to variations in consumption. Furcieri and Zdzienicka (2013) 
build their proposal on this approach. 
8 Benigno and Woodford (2004) derive this functional form somewhat more generally. For a critique, 
see Mayer (2002). 
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In Figure 5, the difference between the welfare losses under the two approaches can be 
determined as the difference between the areas between the green and the red lines to the left 
and to the right of the point where they meet. In the example drawn here, the area to the 
right is much larger, but the two areas must be weighted by the probability of these shocks 
occurring. It thus seems that, a priori, it is not possible to say whether a shock absorber or an 
insurance contract with a deductible is superior.9 
However, there exists a general theorem that insurance with a deductible is superior. Arrow 
(1974) proved that “if we stay within the class of contracts with the same expected loss, EU 
[expected utility] maximisers prefer a contract with full (100%) insurance above a fixed 
deductible”.10 
Figure 5. Welfare loss with a (partial) shock absorber vs. insurance with deductible 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
3.3 An illustration: Normally distributed shocks 
The advantage of insurance with a deductible over a shock absorber (with the same 
premium) can be illustrated graphically using the most widely used functional form 
concerning the distribution of the shocks, namely a normal distribution. This is often a 
convenient assumption to solve linear quadratic problems, but has the disadvantage that, for 
the normal (Gaussian) distribution (or probability density function) of the shock, one can 
                                                   
9 Formally, the cost of a shock absorber under which a fraction alpha of any shock, x, is absorbed by 
the insurer is given by alpha*E(x). If welfare losses are a quadratic function of the shock, one can 
calculate the following expected losses: 1) No shock absorber. In this case, the welfare loss would be 
proportional to the variance of the shock, i.e. E(x2). 2) Shock absorber: In this case, the welfare loss 
would be proportional to the variance of the shock attenuated by the fraction alpha, or (1-
alpha)2*E(x2). 3) Insurance with deductible: In this case, the welfare loss would be given by the sum of 
two elements. For a shock smaller than the deductible (indicated by gamma), one has to take the 
expected value of x2, but for larger shocks (i.e. x>gamma) the welfare loss will be just equal to 
gamma2 (which has to be multiplied by the probability that x>gamma). 
10 See Russel (2004). See also Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) for a more general version of the theorem 
about the optimality of full insurance above some fixed deductible. 
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only calculate numerically the truncated variances and expected values that one needs to 
evaluate the welfare losses and the actuarially fair cost of providing either a shock absorber 
or insurance with a deductible. Another drawback of the normal distribution is that reality 
has ‘fat tails’, i.e. large events occur more often than one would expect if the distribution 
were normal. 
Figure 6 shows the difference between the welfare loss under a shock absorber and under 
insurance with a deductible as a function of the deductible in terms of the standard deviation 
of the distribution of the shock. The size of the shock absorber was adjusted in all cases so 
that the actuarially fair price of both contracts was the same. 
It is apparent from Figure 6 that the welfare loss is always lower under an insurance contract 
with a deductible, as proven more generally by Arrow (1974). 
Figure 6 also shows a general property of insurance with a deductible: the value of such an 
insurance contract depends on the size of the deductible. If the deductible is zero, the 
contract provides full insurance, whereas if it is infinity, there is no insurance at all. This also 
implies that the difference between a shock absorber and insurance with a deductible must 
approach zero as the deductible approaches zero (in this case, the shocks absorber will have 
to approach full shock absorption); and it must also approach zero as the deductible 
approaches infinity, since at that point there will be little difference between the two types of 
insurance. 
Figure 6. Difference between social losses with a proportional shock absorber and an insurance 
mechanism with a deductible 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on data provided by Claudius Gros. 
Figure 6 depicts the case of the shock having a standardised Gaussian distribution. In this 
case, the difference in social welfare losses (a positive value means that the loss is greater 
under a proportional shock absorber without a deductible) reaches a maximum if the 
deductible is equal to one (one standard deviation). In other words, a deductible equal to one 
standard deviation of the shock is the situation under which the advantage of this type of 
contract is largest. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
Many observers and policy-makers now argue that the eurozone needs a system of fiscal 
shock absorbers similar to that of the US. 
Recent studies by the IMF (2013a, 2013b) find that about 20% of shocks to state income are 
offset by the US federal fiscal system. But such a system would have been of limited value in 
the euro crisis. Offering a country whose output falls by 1% (relative to the eurozone 
average) a transfer of 0.2% of GDP would be of limited use, as explained below.  
A country hit by a very large shock, say 5% of GDP (like Portugal or Ireland), would of 
course receive a larger transfer, but the problems would not be substantially different (a fall 
of income by 4% instead of 5%). By contrast, in a system of insurance with a deductible of, 
say, 1% of GDP, the country hit by a small shock would receive nothing. But most of the 
large shock – everything above the 1% deductible – could then be fully offset, safeguarding 
financial stability. 
The overall conclusion that emerges from these considerations is that in the face of large 
shocks, a system that offsets all shocks by some small fraction is of limited use. What would 
really be needed is a system that protects against those shocks that are rare, but potentially 
catastrophic. The many minor cyclical shocks that do not impair the functioning of financial 
markets can then be dealt with via borrowing at the national level. 
It is clear that any such scheme would raise a number of important issues, such as threshold 
effects and potentially also moral hazard problems, as one could argue that coverage of 100% 
of costs (above the threshold) might lead to less self-insurance.  All of these problems exist of 
course in the insurance industry as well.  At the macroeconomic level, one can argue that the 
political cost of a deep recession will be large even if transfers from the European level limit 
the damage to the economy. The incentive to take measures against such shocks (for 
example, through national macro-prudential measures) should thus remain.  The practical 
problems in defining thresholds and pay-outs will be discussed in detail below. 
It is also clear that a scheme that covers rare events implies a high probability that, ex post, a 
few countries (those hit by the rare shocks) will have received large transfers, and all those 
that have not been hit by such a shock during the period of observation will have made a 
(small) loss. 
As an aside, we would argue that the European Stability Mechanism – the eurozone’s rescue 
mechanism – does not provide the needed insurance function because it only provides loans, 
which have to be repaid with interest, rather than a transfer when a shock materialises.  
One practical way to create an insurance mechanism with a deductible would be to create a 
system of reinsurance for national unemployment insurance systems, under which the 
national systems would pay regular premiums to a central eurozone fund. This fund would 
then support the national system in countries where the unemployment rate has increased 
suddenly above a certain threshold. This is the type of absorption capacity that the decision-
makers of the EU should be considering – not merely copying the way the US federal fiscal 
system appears to offset a small proportion of all shocks. The remainder of this study 
benchmarks this approach against others. 
4. The reinsurance in practice 
The main conclusion from the previous theoretical section is that a system of fiscal insurance 
with a fixed deductible would be preferable to a fiscal shock absorber that offsets a certain 
percentage of all fiscal shocks. Our task is far from being concluded at this point; moving 
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from theory to the actual design of the policy is not only a tricky job, it also requires taking a 
number of decisions. What is, for example, the reference unemployment indicator? And 
which type of shock should be insured? What is the optimal set of countries to subscribe to 
this system? We describe in detail in this section every element of the insurance we propose: 
the trigger, the claim, the deductible, the pay-in and the pay-out. We also present the results 
of our Excel-based simulations of how the European unemployment reinsurance system 
would work.11 
4.1 The trigger 
In our model, what triggers the mechanism that starts the policy is a certain type of 
unemployment shock. In order to be eligible for help, the unemployment rate in the country 
hit by a recession must be higher than a certain threshold. Which unemployment rate and 
which threshold? 
For the former, we consider the short-term unemployment rate, whereby the number of 
workers unemployed for less than 12 months and willing to work is divided by the active 
population (employed and unemployed aged 15 to 64). Among several ways to measure 
unemployment, this is the one that is affected most by the cycle; the total unemployment rate 
also includes the long-term unemployed whose condition is more structural than cyclical.  
The threshold we consider for country i at time t is equal to  
ݏݐܷܴ௜௧ > ݏݐܷܴపതതതതതതതത + 	ߛߪ௦௧௎ோ௜ 
Where ݏݐܷܴపതതതതതതതത	stands for the 10-year moving average of the short-term unemployment rate 
and ߪ for the 10-year moving standard deviation of the short-term unemployment rate. In 
less technical terms, the scheme is triggered when actual short-term unemployment exceeds 
the sum of the 10-year average and a multiple of the standard deviation of the short-term 
unemployment rate.  
We multiply the standard deviation by several values of ߛ to test different triggers, closer or 
larger to the average: 0.1, 1 and 2, which we call respectively ‘Brussels rain’, a ‘storm’ and a 
‘tornado’.  
We chose ten years as the reference to calculate the moving averages and standard 
deviations because such a period is long enough to include a complete cycle, but at the same 
time not too long to make changes in structural unemployment remarkable.  
As can be seen in Figure 7, based on such a mechanism, had the policy been in place in the 
period 2000-12, it would have intervened: 
 161 times in case of Brussels rain (standard deviation equal to 0.1); 
 90 times in case of storms (standard deviation equal to 1); and 
 40 times in case of tornados (standard deviation equal to 2). 
                                                   
11 From a methodological point of view, it should be emphasised that Excel-based simulation has 
advantages and limitations. The key advantage is that we can quickly simulate a variety of options at 
both the EU and country level with limited resources. It is suitable for the calculation of revenues and 
expenditures and to give a flavour of how important the system would be compared to the existing 
national stabilisers. On the other hand, it is not a general or partial equilibrium model that would 
show dynamic effects of such a system on the member states, or on the EU economy as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the results that emerge from the simulation suggest that the size of the stimulus would 
not in any case be large enough to have material second-order effects. 
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Figure 7. Number of cases had the reinsurance been in place since 2000 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat and AMECO data.  
For larger values of ߛ, the country is eligible for funding if it is hit by a shock of a magnitude 
that goes beyond ‘business as usual’. The underlying assumption is that national social 
policies, in many countries in place for more than 100 years, are well equipped to deal with a 
normal crisis. The added value of such a supra-national mechanism is that it would provide 
assistance in case of major downturns, where countries will most likely have to face not only 
the unemployment surge, but also financial pressure.  
As can be seen from Figure 8, the number of interventions increases not only with higher 
unemployment rates, but also with higher deviations from it. This means that the policy is 
triggered more often in case of asymmetric shocks.  
Figure 8. Correlation between the number of cases12 and unemployment rates and standard deviation 
  
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat and AMECO data.  
 
                                                   
12 For SD = 2, the tornado cases.  
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Box 1. Short-term vs. total unemployment rate 
The unemployment rate would be prima facie the most natural choice of indicator, because it is 
indeed meant for the assessment of employment policies. In addition, it is a solid indicator, 
given that it is based on a headcount.13 Nevertheless, it presents some issues. 
First, an old debate exists among labour economists on the solidity of this indicator, which is 
considered by many experts to be inappropriate for measuring the temperature of the labour 
market. The reason is that the unemployment rate does not measure the share of people who 
do not have work in the population, but the share of those in the labour force who do not have 
a job and are also actively looking for one. Therefore, those who are available to work but are 
not actively job-seeking are not recorded by the unemployment statistics collected following 
the standard ILO definition.14  
Second, it is important to note that a significant part of the unemployment rate is unrelated to 
short-term shocks and is of a structural nature. The group of unemployed which it measures is 
made up of two main sub-groups: those whose unemployment duration is a small natural 
transition from one job to another, and those with a longer unemployment duration due to the 
fact that their skills do not match existing vacancies. The former has a short-term nature, 
whereas the latter is much more persistent and requires enormous effort to be curbed. A policy 
that does not take structural differences into account would, as a consequence, give rise to 
a rather unbalanced flow of funds over time. This is a problem if one focuses on the 
redistribution rationale rather than on one aimed at cushioning shocks. 
Since the cushioning rationale appears to be among the key arguments for the creation of an 
EUI, we do not recommend using a headline unemployment rate. For this reason, we propose 
considering not the overall unemployment rate, but the short-term rate. This would be 
consistent with the fact that unemployment benefits generally do not cover the entire 
unemployment spell, but instead have a maximum length of eligibility.15 An unlimited 
duration constitutes a disincentive to look for a job, especially if the income subsidy is 
generous.  
The EU short-term unemployment rate, defined as less than 12 months of unemployment, was 
on average 4% during the period 2003-12. 
 
4.2 The claim 
The claim is the materialised utility of insurance, i.e. what the insured is entitled to receive 
based on the agreement with the insurer. We base the claim on the same reference indicator 
as the trigger: short-term unemployment. We argue that the amount required by a country to 
face a crisis without the need to cut unemployment benefits when they are needed the most 
is based on the following formula:  
ܥ௜௧ = 0.4ܰܥܧ௜௧ 	ݔ	12݉݋݊ݐℎݏ௜௧	ݔ	0.8ݏݐ ௜ܷ௧ 			 
                                                   
13 The headcount is not based on the entire working population – only a small share of the population 
is interviewed for the Labour Force Survey. However, the methodology is solid and agreed at the EU 
level via Eurostat. 
14 Further explanation can be found on the Eurostat website at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
statistics_explained/index.php/Underemployment_and_potential_additional_labour_force_statistics. 
15 Belgium, where unemployment benefits are provided until the worker finds a new occupation, is an 
exception. In all countries during the past two decades, systems have become less and less generous in 
order to create the incentive to reduce the length of the work-to-work transition.  
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The claim for country i at time t is equal to 12 months of benefits, equal to 40% of the national 
average compensation of employees (NCE), paid to 80% of short-term unemployed workers 
(stU).  
The figures “0.4, 12 and 0.8” are discretionary parameters. Our choice is justified by the 
compromise between a sound policy and the need to ensure a strong stabilising effect. More 
specifically, we design the insurance in such a way that:  
 It covers as many unemployed workers as possible, but not all because it is unlikely that 
all qualify for unemployment benefits, which in all countries are linked to a contribution 
for a certain number of months (ranging from 6 months of contribution over the previous 
24 in the UK to 12 months over the previous 18 in Belgium). 
 It is characterised by a relatively generous replacement rate.16 
 It lasts long enough to secure an income for unemployed workers in times with few 
employment opportunities, but not too long to discourage them from finding another job.  
In this proposal, no conditionality is applied to how the funds are spent.  
4.3 The deductible 
In Section 2, we explain how “if we stay within the class of contracts with the same expected 
loss, EU [expected utility] maximizers prefer a contract with full (100%) insurance above a 
fixed deductible” (Arrow, 1974). This is based on the assumption that the insurance is useful 
when the cost of unpredictable events is convex, i.e. when a shock of twice the magnitude of 
another one causes more than twice as much damage. The deductible can also be considered 
a form of additionality, a principle often applied to EU funds (i.e. the EU should only 
contribute in addition to what the national government is normally spending, not replace the 
national expenditure). From another perspective, this magnifies the stabilisation function of 
the expenditure for a given size of the EUI system. 
What should the deductible look like? We base the calculation on the expenditure on passive 
labour market policies. However, for countries that have unemployment benefits for 
unemployed for extended periods (more than 12 months), we cannot include all such 
expenditure. The reason is that the EUI needs to contribute to the part of the expenditure that 
is related to short-term unemployment and not to the structural/long-term component. The 
longer the duration of unemployment benefits in a certain country, the smaller the 
percentage of passive labour market policies (PLMP) that is counted, since larger portions of 
the expenditure go to non-short-term unemployed.  
Eurostat collects data from EU countries on what portion of their public budgets is dedicated 
to labour market policies, broken down in great detail by type of expenditure.  Employment 
subsidies, for instance, are distinguished from early-retirement schemes. However, it is not 
possible to derive the share of expenditure by duration of the unemployment spell. For this 
reason, we rely on a formula that is based on the assumption that countries that grant 
unemployment benefits for a longer period spend a lower share of their budget on newly 
unemployed. Our calculation is only an approximation, but if the EUI were to be 
implemented, it would be fairly easy to collect such data on a precise basis. 
As can be seen in Figure 9, there is high heterogeneity in Europe when it comes to the 
maximum duration of unemployment benefits (UB), from three months in Hungary to 
essentially unlimited in Belgium.  
                                                   
16 Only in four countries in the eurozone is the gross replacement rate below 40%: Malta, Ireland, 
Austria and Germany.  
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Figure 9. Maximum duration of unemployment benefits in Europe  
 
Sources: Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) database. 
For this reason and based on the formula below, we design a larger deductible for those 
countries that grant unemployment benefits for a longer duration.  
The deductible is equal to the smaller of the following values: 
 1/(1+1/2*(length on UB provision in months -12)/12) 
 1 
The deductible is applied to the 10-year average expenditure on PLMP. Based on the above 
coefficient, a country such as the Netherlands, with long provision of unemployment 
benefits, will be applied a deductible equal to half of its expenditure on PLMP for that year.  
4.4 The pay-out 
The actual pay-out of the fund boils down to the difference between the claim and the 
deductible for every short-term unemployment rate higher than ݏݐܷܴపതതതതതതതത + 	ߛߪ௦௧௎ோ௜. Had the 
EUI been in place since the beginning of the Great Recession, depending on the trigger 
chosen and assuming it was more or less sensible, it would have disbursed on average 
between 0.5% and 1.3% of GDP in each country between 2008 and 2012 (details by country in 
Figure 10).   
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Figure 10. Cumulative payout, 2008-12 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat and AMECO data.  
In the most stringent version – i.e. standard deviation equal to 2 – 12 countries would have 
benefited from the reinsurance for at least one year: Spain, Greece, Latvia, Estonia, the UK, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Slovenia, Romania, Portugal and Lithuania. Only in the first three 
countries would the total pay-out have been higher than 2% of GDP over the period 2008-12.   
4.5 The pay-in 
How is the system financed? A basic contribution of 0.1% of GDP is paid annually until 0.5% 
of EU GDP is accumulated. Contributions would then stop and would be restarted if the 
fund fell to below 0.5% of EU output. In practice, if the trigger is really low (for example, 
standard deviation of 0.1), the pay-in is continuous. If the triggers are higher, it becomes a 
start-stop mechanism. 
The basic contribution is multiplied by a form of ‘experience rating’17 that reflects the 
country balance with the fund over the last ten years. Technically:  
 The coefficient equals the sum of 10 annual coefficients. 
 The annual coefficient is 0.1 if the country balance in a given year is positive or negative, 
but less than 0.1% of GDP.  
 But if the country balance in a given year is negative and equal to or higher than 0.1% of 
GDP, then the annual coefficient is equal to the balance. 
As a result, countries that draw heavily on the fund gradually start paying in more, but with 
a delay of several years until this becomes noticeable so that the net stabilisation effect of the 
reinsurance is strong even for a pronounced recession. In Figure 11, we can see that a heavy 
                                                   
17 Also called ‘claw-back’ in the jargon of this debate. The main objective is to adjust the contributions 
to the fund in such a way as to avoid large and permanent transfers between member states.  
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use of funds by Poland, the Baltic states and Slovakia in the early 2000s due to the post-1998 
recession, combined with renewed utilisation in the post-2008 recession, would result in high 
pay-in during the period we show. Extremely heavy use of the funds by Spain at the end of 
the 2000s would not yet translate into a cumulatively very high pay-in by 2012, but Spain 
would continue to have high contributions for years to come. 
Figure 11. Average annual pay-in as a percentage of GDP, 2000-10 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat and AMECO data.  
Note: Figures refer to SD = 0.1. Differences are very small when SD=1 and SD=2 are considered.  
 
Box 2. Technical aspects of the simulation 
The simulation is based on historical data from 2000 to 2012, which gives a 13-year period. 
Thus, the simulation shows how the reinsurance would have worked if these mechanisms had 
existed at the time. Since it is an intellectual exercise, it includes countries that joined in the 
2004 and 2007 waves as if they had been EU members at the time. The point is to show the 
potential effects of the EUI based on historical data as a counterfactual, not to simulate history. 
The decision to start in 2000 was based on data availability, particularly for the new member 
states. 
The main data we use are: GDP, unemployment and short-term unemployment rates, passive 
labour market policies expenditure, nominal compensation per employee, and duration of 
unemployment benefits. As a source of data, we use AMECO, the annual macroeconomic 
database of the European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs and Eurostat.  
We start our simulation in the year 2000, which means we start the time series from the year 
1990 to construct the 10-year moving averages. This means that for the early years, we resort to 
simulations to fill the gaps of missing data. This concerns, in particular, detailed information 
on unemployment by duration. Given that the short-term unemployment rate is a vital 
variable for this simulation, to fill the gaps, we use the complete series to determine a linear 
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
Portugal
Belgium
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
France
Ireland
Cyprus
Slovenia
Hungary
Czech Republic
Malta
Lithuania
Romania
United Kingdom
Greece
Latvia
Spain
Bulgaria
Slovakia
Estonia
Poland
%
 o
f G
DP
20  BEBLAVÝ, GROS & MASELLI 
 
relationship between short-term unemployment and output growth, a sort of short-term Okun 
coefficient. We produce one coefficient per country and, based on output data, we use the 
coefficient to estimate what the short-term unemployment would have been in that year. In 
some cases like France, Italy and Slovakia, the relationship is strong (R-squared higher than 
0.5); in some others, like Poland and Austria, it is much weaker. Yet, this remains a fictitious 
problem – if the EUI were to be set up tomorrow in the way we propose, all the necessary data 
would be available for all countries.  
We also used 10-year average expenditure on passive labour market policies (PLMP) in each 
country. The information is used to calculate the deductible applicable to the insurance. The 
time series starts in 1998 for older EU member states, and in the mid-2000s for the remaining 
ones. To fill in the gaps for the earlier years, we simply refer to the long-term average. This 
may not be an optimal solution, as it does not take into account variations determined by the 
business cycle, but such variations are not as large as one would imagine given that only a 
portion of the expenditure goes to the newly unemployed workers.  
 
4.6 The EUI balance for the EU and for selected countries 
Based on the selected parameters, we compute the balance of the fund over the entire period 
as the difference between the pay-in and the pay-out. Whether the yearly or cumulative 
balance is considered, three observations need to be made: 
 The balance remains largely positive until the Great Recession. Then, because of the 
magnitude of the crisis, it passes from almost +€20 billion to less than -€20 billion.  
 The difference between Brussels rain or a storm versus the tornado emerges clearly. In 
the latter case, in fact, the balance returns to positive very quickly after 2010 (Figure 12).   
 Expressed in terms of a percentage of EU output, the highest annual contribution of the 
fund to crisis countries (-€30 billion) is 0.3% in 2009.  
Figure 12. Fund yearly balance 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat and AMECO data.  
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Figure 13. Fund cumulative balance 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat and AMECO data.  
In Figure 14, detailed data are provided for selected countries for ‘stormy times’. In the case 
of Greece and Spain, the net balance of the fund remains positive until the outbreak of the 
Great Recession, which impacts on labour markets first in Spain (by 2008) and then in Greece 
(in 2009). The annual contribution received by the fund is in the range of 0.6% to 2.2% of 
GDP. In 2008 in Spain and in 2010 in Greece, the balance of the fund turns from positive to 
negative: the pay-out peaks rapidly due to the severe downturn, while the pay-in also 
increases but more slowly. Both Spain and Greece are hit heavily by the Great Recession, but 
in Spain the absolute numbers are much larger. The difference comes not only from short-
term unemployment, in the range of 3 million workers in Spain, but also the nominal 
compensation per employee, which is 30% higher in Spain, influencing the size of the claim.18 
Estonia benefits from the fund during the Great Recession, but also qualifies for benefits 
earlier in 2000 and 2003. Germany does not qualify for help during the period analysed 
(2000-2012), and therefore remains a net contributor.  
                                                   
18  Spain and Greece compared in 2009.  
 Spain Greece 
Short-term unemployed (1,000) 3,100 274 
Short-term unemployment rate 9.9% 3.6% 
Claim (billion euros) 34 2.3 
Deductible (% of GDP) 1.03 0.44% 
Nominal compensation of employees (euros) 33,600 26,600 
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Figure 14. Fund balance in selected countries for ‘stormy days’ (SD = 1).   
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Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat and AMECO data. 
 
4.7 The stabilisation impact of the reinsurance   
This section presents a range of estimates of stabilisation effects of the European 
unemployment insurance system. We use a simple estimate of the stabilisation effect: every 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0
5,000,000,000
10,000,000,000
15,000,000,000
20,000,000,000
25,000,000,000
30,000,000,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
%
 o
f G
D
P
eu
ro
s
Germany
Annual pay-out (%GDP)
Cumulative Pay-in (euros)
Cumulative pay-out (euros)
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
0
100,000,000
200,000,000
300,000,000
400,000,000
500,000,000
600,000,000
700,000,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
%
 o
f G
D
P
eu
ro
s
Estonia
Annual pay-out (%GDP)
Cumulative Pay-in (euros)
Cumulative pay-out (euros)
24  BEBLAVÝ, GROS & MASELLI 
 
year starting from 2008, we multiply the net inflow coming from the EUI fund by a 
multiplier.  
The rationale is that this allows us to calculate the value added of the European mechanism 
had it existed at the time. We propose calculations only for major shocks, which means that 
only certain countries are considered. Our underlying argument is that the cost of ‘non-
Europe’ is disproportionately high in case of large downturns. Economic policies that have 
existed in European countries for a century are more than able to cope on their own with 
small output fluctuations. This does not exclude other rationales for creating a EUI even for 
minor shocks (as presented by the ‘Brussels rain’ option with standard deviation equal to 
0.1).  
Deciding on the multiplier is a non-trivial and somewhat subjective exercise. As shown in 
Box 3, estimations provided by the literature on this issue vary between $0.7 and $3 for every 
$1 spent on unemployment insurance. The issue is further complicated by the fact that 
estimates vary not only according to the methodology chosen, but also by country. An 
additional obstacle is the fact that most studies analyse the US example, which, while it is the 
closest among advanced economies to the European one in terms of size, cannot be 
considered identical due to the fact that the US economy is structurally different. We 
therefore need to make a choice.  
Despite such complications, we consider a multiplier of 1.5 to be safe, which is a conservative 
estimate close to that from four of the five studies selected (see Box 3). We apply this 
multiplier to the net inflow from the EUI funds for the period 2008-12 to six countries (those 
that suffered most during the Great Recession) as an illustration.  
 
Box 3. Review of the literature on the multiplier effect of unemployment benefits 
Among the different categories of public expenditure, unemployment benefits emerge with the 
most virtues. First, they kick in automatically, as soon as unemployment starts soaring and 
workers who have lost their jobs apply for them. A second important virtue is that this type of 
expenditure goes where it is most needed: to support the consumption capacity of households 
whose labour income has suddenly vanished.  
Since Keynes’ times, economists have believed that public expenditure generates an input to 
growth that is higher than the expenditure itself due to a multiplier effect. The multiplier 
varies according to both the type of expenditure and the characteristics of the economy (IMF, 
2009).    
Quantifying this multiplier is extremely challenging, as witnessed by the fact that studies do 
not agree on a common number. Different methodologies lead to different results, even when 
the same case is analysed (IMF, 2009). Zandi (2008) calculates that in the United States, a $1 
increase in unemployment benefits generates an estimated $1.64 in near-term GDP. Vroman 
(2010) believes this impact to be larger: every $1 spent on unemployment insurance increases 
economic activity by $2. An older study by the US Department of Labor estimates that on 
average (over six periods defined between 1972 and 2001), $1 of unemployment insurance 
benefit generated GDP growth of $2.15, with the multiplier effects of each of these six periods 
ranging between $1.54 and $3.07. Monacelli et al. (2010) estimate that “in response to an 
increase in government spending normalised to 1% of GDP, we estimate an output multiplier 
well above one, in the range of 1.2-1.5 (at one-year and two-year horizon respectively)”.  
A recent estimate by the US Congressional Budget Office (2010) is less precise: increasing aid to 
the unemployed by $1 is estimated to have increased GDP by between $0.7 and $1.9 during the 
period 2010-15. 
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As already explained, we look at episodes of major distress, where the value added of the 
EUI is most relevant. Calculations are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Example of stabilisation effect of the reinsurance during the Great Recession in selected 
countries (percentage of GDP)19 
Stdev = 0.1 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 SUM 
Estonia 2.49 1.74 0.00 4.22 
Greece 0.58 0.86 1.34 1.60 4.38 
Ireland  0.48 0.48 
Latvia 1.07 3.25 1.85 0.50 0.42 7.08 
Lithuania 2.42 2.13 0.91 0.62 6.08 
Spain 1.37 3.06 2.28 1.91 2.12 10.74 
Portugal 0.03 0.43 0.46 
Stdev = 1 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 SUM 
Estonia 2.55 1.79 4.33 
Greece 0.70 0.97 1.44 1.65 4.76 
Ireland  0.48 0.48 
Latvia 3.34 1.93 5.27 
Lithuania 2.42 2.13 4.54 
Spain 1.52 3.05 2.27 1.90 2.11 10.84 
Portugal 0.03 0.43 0.46 
Stdev = 2 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 SUM 
Estonia 2.62 2.62 
Greece 0.70 0.97 1.44 1.65 4.76 
Ireland  0.48 0.48 
Latvia 3.34 3.34 
Lithuania 2.42 2.42 
Spain 1.37 3.06 2.28 6.71 
Portugal 0.03 0.43 0.46 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat and AMECO data.  
We start with the Spanish case, which is in the limelight during the current crisis due to 
skyrocketing unemployment figures. The net inflow, multiplied by the fiscal multiplier of 
unemployment benefits, generates an additional output equal to between 6.7% and 10.8% of 
GDP over the 2008-2012 period. Another interesting case is that of the Baltic countries, where 
the combined effect of the EUI funds and their (assumed) multiplier is no less than 2.4% of 
GDP in 2009. However, it declines faster than in Spain due to the faster recovery of the three 
                                                   
19The reader may notice that these numbers are different from those in Figure 10. The reason is that 
they show different things: in Figure 10 the cumulative payout is presented, while Table 1 shows the 
fund balance multiplied by the multiplier of 1.5. 
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economies. In Greece, the European mechanism kicks in from 2009. The total impact on the 
economy is around 4.7% of GDP over the entire period, for any standard deviation 
considered. Finally, in Ireland, EUI funds are provided in 2009 and, combined with their 
multiplier effect, generate an additional output equal to 0.5% of GDP.  
In Table 2 we compare the actual evolution of GDP growth with that estimated in Table 1, 
that is, if the EUI had been in place. It is important to note that the exercise is as speculative 
as it is interesting, since second-round general equilibrium effects are completely ignored in 
the calculation due to the fact that it is not based on general equilibrium model. Yet, it shows 
how a supranational stabiliser could provide partial relief to a crisis country. In the cases of 
Spain, Estonia and Lithuania, a European fund would have turned negative growth positive. 
In the remaining cases, it would have reduced the negative impact of the crisis.  
It is worth noting that the differences between the contribution triggered by a standard 
deviation of 0.1, 1 or 2 are not huge, meaning that similar results can be achieved via a fund 
that is triggered only by ‘catastrophic’ unemployment events.   
Table 2. Comparison of actual GDP evolution and GDP growth with EUI 
Stdev = 0.1 
  Actual GDP growth Actual GDP growth + EUI fund * multiplier 
Estonia -2.2 2.0 
Greece -22.4 -18.0 
Ireland  -7.3 -6.8 
Latvia -11.3 -4.2 
Lithuania -0.6 5.4 
Spain -4.7 6.0 
Portugal -5.5 -5.0 
Stdev = 1 
  Actual GDP growth Actual GDP growth + EUI fund * multiplier 
Estonia -2.2 2.1 
Greece -22.4 -17.6 
Ireland  -7.3 -6.8 
Latvia -11.3 -6.0 
Lithuania -0.6 3.9 
Spain -4.7 6.1 
Portugal -5.5 -5.0 
Stdev = 2 
  Actual GDP growth Actual GDP growth + EUI fund * multiplier 
Estonia -2.2 0.4 
Greece -22.4 -17.6 
Ireland  -7.3 -6.8 
Latvia -11.3 -7.9 
Lithuania -0.6 1.8 
Spain -4.7 2.0 
Portugal -5.5 -5.0 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat and AMECO data.  
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5. Summary of results and recommendations 
In this section, we summarise our results and offer recommendations. Since the paper itself is 
relatively brief, this final summary does not rehash all the data and conclusions, but focuses 
on key messages and conclusions.  
 Why reinsurance? 
The primary motivation for designing the reinsurance proposal was to discover whether a 
national shock absorption mechanism for the EU (eurozone) can be designed that can deliver 
relevance in terms of size/fiscal stabilisation effects for individual countries and, at the same 
time, be politically realistic in terms of contributions/costs. This study has shown that the 
reinsurance proposal delivers, for a small average contribution, large shock absorption 
capacities. At the same time, due to a threshold issue, it is not suitable for EU-level 
absorption of small national shocks (because it delivers a large punch once activated, low 
thresholds lead to fairly arbitrary results). The design that we have presented is not the only 
possible one, but we believe it presents a balanced package delivering on our aim to devise a 
scheme that is economically and politically feasible.  
 What should be the trigger for assistance? 
In the analysis we included triggers of various sizes, all based on deviation of short-term 
unemployment from its long-term average. We calculated triggers of 0.1, 1 and 2 standard 
deviations from the long-term average, which we call ‘Brussels rain’, a ‘storm’ and a 
‘tornado’, respectively. 
Based on this analysis, our view is that the optimal trigger is between 1 and 2 standard 
deviations of short-term unemployment (i.e. between a storm and a tornado), since a trigger 
in this range is sufficiently high to be activated only in situations of severe shock, but 
sufficiently low to react to such situations.  
Where to place the trigger within this range is a matter of political preference. We calculated 
that, had the policy been in place in the period 2000-12, it would have intervened: 
 90 times in case of storms (standard deviation equal to 1), and 
 40 times in case of tornados (standard deviation equal to 2). 
The key difference between a standard deviation of 1 and 2 was not in calmer times, but 
during the height of the financial and economic crisis. A standard deviation of 2 led to 
approximately half of the countries drawing on reinsurance during the height of the crisis, 
while a standard deviation of of 1 led to nearly all of the member states drawing on 
assistance at the height of the crisis. 
 How much should the reinsurance system pay to affected countries? 
In defining how much the system should pay out once it is activated, there are four main 
questions: 
 What should be the size of the claim? 
 Should there be a deductible? 
 If there is a deductible, how large should it be? 
 Should there be conditionality? 
The first question is how to determine the reinsurance claim – what should the affected 
country in principle be entitled to? We based this on actual short-term unemployment and 
generous (although notional) unemployment benefit coverage. We use the term ‘notional’ 
because we do not propose to link this to actual payments to the unemployed, but for 
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determining transfers to national coffers. We design it relatively generously to ensure a 
sizeable stabilisation impact, particularly since a deductible is also foreseen. The claim for 
country i at time t is equal to 12 months of benefits (12UB) equal to 40% of the national 
average compensation of employees (NCE) paid to 80% of short-term unemployed workers 
(stU). 
The next issue is whether to include a deductible. We recommend the inclusion of a 
deductible for several reasons: 
 According to economic theory, the inclusion of a deductible in insurance is welfare-
enhancing. 
 For a given amount of funding, it amplifies the stabilisation function of the system. 
 It makes the proposal more politically appealing, as it includes the principle of 
additionality whereby the EU assistance is in addition to national funding rather than 
replacing it. 
How should the deductible be determined? Our formula for a claim is based on a notion of 
coverage of short-term unemployment benefits in a crisis. Therefore, it is logical that the 
deductible should be based on actual long-term average spending on benefits for the short-
term unemployed. In such a case, the actual payment would be the difference between 
shock-induced ST unemployment and the long-term average of ST unemployment, 
multiplied by the difference between the standardised EU-level notion of unemployment 
benefits and the actual country benefits.  
Therefore, the payment would be a positive function of the shock’s severity and a negative 
function of the national system’s generosity (in terms of the replacement rate and the 
coverage of short-term unemployed).  
We do not propose any conditionality on the use of payments from the European fund. 
However, if there were a political decision to impose such conditionality, then we would 
advise: 
 linking it to general use for passive and active labour market policies rather than to 
specific prescriptions on structural size of national unemployment insurance, and 
 not linking the whole amount to labour market policy use, since there is a need for 
national governments to retain some fiscal flexibility in times of severe shock. 
 How should the national contribution be calculated? 
With regard to the financing of the system, we propose three features: 
 The size of the fund and the annual contributions should be large enough to cover all but 
the most severe EU-wide symmetric shocks. 
 For severe EU-wide symmetric shocks, the fund should retain an option for borrowing or 
one-time extraordinary contributions by members. 
 Country premiums should be differentiated according to risk, and this risk should be 
based on backward-looking expectations. This would also ensure a rough long-term 
balance between contributions and benefits for each country. 
Our specific proposal features a basic contribution of 0.1% of GDP paid annually by each 
country until 0.5% of EU GDP is accumulated. Contributions would then stop, and would be 
restarted if the fund fell to below 0.5% of EU output. The basic contribution is multiplied by 
a form of ‘experience rating’ that reflects the country’s balance with the fund over the last ten 
years (if a country has a negative balance of more than 0.1% of GDP in any given year, the 
experience rating starts to worsen proportionally to the negative balance). 
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 The size of the macroeconomic impact 
We also calculated the possible macroeconomic stabilisation impact of the European 
unemployment insurance if it were designed according to our proposals. Our figures are just 
rough estimates based on an expected multiplier of 1.5, but they offer a useful guide to verfiy 
the thesis that the system should have a sizeable stabilisation property. During the crisis 
years of 2009 and 2010, the hard-hit Baltic countries and Spain could have counted on a 
stabilisation effect of between 1.75% and 3.25% of GDP annually. For Greece and Ireland, the 
effects would have been much smaller – between 0.5% and 0.9% of GDP in 2009 and 2010 – 
but assistance for Greece would have continued in 2011 and 2012, exceeding 1% of GDP in 
both years. These are indeed non-trivial numbers, so a properly designed reinsurance 
scheme could deliver significant stabilisation benefits for fairly limited costs. 
 Which group of countries should optimally participate in the scheme? 
For the European unemployment reinsurance to function, it can be applied to either the 
whole EU (i.e. the 28 member states) or to just the eurozone. While there is a general 
presumption that it should be just the Eurozone, and our proposal can easily be adjusted to 
such a sample, we would recommend considering the whole EU for the following reasons: 
 Ceteris paribus, broader membership allows for better diversification of risks for all 
members.  
 Many of the member states that are not members of the eurozone have their exchange 
rate policies tightly linked to the euro (fixed exchange rates, currency boards, etc.).  
 From a pure simulation point of view, only the UK and Denmark have a permanent opt-
out from euro membership, so any long-term simulation should presume that eurozone 
membership would resemble the current EU membership. 
Our simulations were therefore based on the inclusion of 27 EU member states (Croatia was 
excluded due to the unavailability of data). 
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